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WELFARE, PRODUCTIVITY AND SELF-MANAGEMENT
Summary
This paper considers the implications of workers' prefer­
ences on the uses of their own labour power for the theory of 
the firm in general and, in particular, for the labour-managed 
firm. Maximization of utility of workers is regarded as a 
more plausible objective for the labour-managed firm. It fol­
lows that ceteris paribus workers can achieve greater welfare 
under self-management; their productivity will be lower than 
in the profit-maximizing and the income-per-head maximizing 
firms, while it can be either higher or lower (but probably 
higher) than the participatory and the conflictual types of 
firms.
Introduction
In recent literature self-management (and/or workers' 
participation) has been advocated for several reasons. This 
paper is concerned with one important reason for self-manage­
ment: that self-management allows a firm to take decisions so
that workers' preferences on the uses of their own labour pow­
er are taken into account. This advantage of self-management 
























































































































































































nated differently from the operation of the market mechanism. 
Planning replaces the market within the firm. Market prices 
coordinate production only outside the firm. Within the firm 
the employer replaces the role of market prices and coordi­
nates production. In a firm, Coase observes, "if a workman 
moves from department Y to department X, he does not go be­
cause of a change in relative prices but because he is or-
2dered to do so".
3H. Simon has clarified how the relationship between the 
employer and the employee differs from other market contracts 
and leaves room for the firm-type coordination outlined here. 
According to Simon the employment contract "differs fundamen­
tally from a sales contract— the kind of contract that is as­
sumed in ordinary formulations of price theory. In the sales
contract, each party promises a specific consideration in re-
4turn for the consideration promised by the other." By con­
trast, the employment contract involves that, in exchange for 
a given wage, the employee agrees to accept the authority of 
the employer and the employer is allowed to decide which par­
ticular actions the worker will perform. Hence, after the 
employment contract is signed, the planning of the employer 
replaces the market mechanism. Simon, Coase and, more re­
cently, K. Arrow5 and 0. Williamson5 have given explanations 
for the fact that in important spheres of economic activity 
firms replace the market as a coordinating mechanism. This 
paper is not concerned with these explanations, but notes 
that all these authors agree that the firm is an island of 




























































































greater welfare than workers of a textbook, profit-maximizing 
firm.
While the effects of self-management on workers' welfare 
can be stated in such an unambiguous way, the effects of self- 
management are rather unpredictable. Labour productivity is 
lower in a self-managed firm than in a textbook, profit-maxi­
mizing firm. On the other hand, the textbook, profit-maximiz­
ing firm is reinterpreted here as an extreme case where work­
ers' preferences have no weight. Less extreme cases such as 
the "participatory" and "conflictual" firm are examined. When 
compared with these other firms, the self-managed firm can show 
higher labour productivity (although the opposite may be true).
The paper is divided into three sections. The first sec­
tion defines a "firm" and reviews some traditional equivalence 
results between the profit-maximizing and self-managed firm.
In the second section workers' preferences are introduced into 
the analysis and the equivalence results of the first section 
are replaced by the different results achieved by the profit- 
maximizing, the participatory, the conflictual and the self- 
managed firm. Finally, in the third section, the performance 
properties of the self-managed firm are compared with those 
which characterize the "participatory" and "conflictual" firms.
11. In his article "The Nature of the Firm" R. Coase ob­
served how the firm is both a possible agent of a market econo- 




























































































respect his authority (within certain limits, of course) for a 
wage, such that the employer is "free" to decide whether, on a 
particular day, the worker should draw and/or straighten and/or 
cut the wire. In this case, if the employer perceives that 
these tasks are being performed in the "wrong" proportions, he 
can simply formulate a new plan and give new instructions to 
the workers. This third case is the only one where we can say 
that firms (defined as above) exist in the economy or, in other 
words, that sales contracts (for intermediate products and 
tasks) have been replaced by the employment contract.
Now, take a very simple case of a representative firm; a 
firm in the sense outlined above. Labour power is bought and 
sold in the market at price w but the uses of labour power are 
not the objects of market contracts. These uses of labour pow­
er (or tasks) are decided by the employer and are a matter of 
firm-type (instead of market-type) coordination. We focus at­
tention on this planning problem by making as simple a case as 
possible. Assume (implicitly) that the amount of capital used 
by the firm (as well as by the twin cooperative considered 
next) is exogenously fixed. Furthermore, assume that there are 
only two uses of labour power (or tasks) (keeping in mind that 
the number of these tasks can be very large in real-life repre­
sentative firms). Under these simplifying assumptions the firm 
has only to decide: (i) how much output to produce, (ii) how
much labour power to employ, (iii) how to allocate labour power 
between the two tasks assumed to be necessary for the output of 
the firm to be produced. Assume that the firm faces a competi­
tive market price p for the output Q and pays a competitive 




























































































which the two tasks are performed by and x2 and the total 
amount of labour power employed by N. Thus we have:
x + x = N (1.1)1 2
The production function of the firm is:
Q = f (x1 ,x2) (1 .2)
To take decisions (i), (ii) and (iii) described above, the 
firm will
maximize pQ - wN (1.3)




6x. ÔX- 1 2
(1.4)
(1.5)
Condition (1.5) implies that labour power is allocated within 
the firm so that the marginal product of labour is the same 
in each of the tasks (marginal productivity rule). We can 
easily see that the same result would be achieved by a self- 
managed cooperative if its only goal were to maximize income 
per member, i.e.
PQto maximize y = —— (1.6)N






N - pf(x ,x2)
N




























































































8tasks. The preceding section shares this assumption since 
welfare has been assumed to be influenced only by the amount 
of output produced by one unit of labour power and not also 
by the way that unit of labour power is allocated among 
different tasks.
Now, remove this restrictive way of modelling workers' 
preferences and assume that society's welfare depends on both 
output produced and the (dis)utility derived by employing one 
unit of labour power. In more formal language, assume that 
welfare maximization is obtained by maximizing the weighted 
sum of the utils (derived from the output) and the utility of 
work per unit of labour power. I.e.
where U(x^,x2) is the (dis)utility of work and a and b are 
respectively the weights of the productivity and (dis)utility 
of work. Also assume that a = 1 - b. Maximizing (2.1) 
yields the following first-order necessary conditions:
W
auQ + bU(x1 ,x2)
(2 .1 )N
Nau — ---auQ + Nb ^ ---- bU(x ,x )
o x , o x . i zi i 0 i = 1,2
and therefore
auQ + bU(x1,x2) r>
N W i = 1 ,2





























































































(2.2) implies that labour power should be employed so that the 
weighted sum of marginal productivity (in "utils") and the 
marginal (dis)utility of labour power should be the same in each 
use of labour power. In general (2.2) also implies that the 
marginal productivity rule should not be employed as a management 
criterion since it ignores the preferences of workers as to the 
allocation of their labour power. More precisely the marginal 
productivity rule is a sub-case of (2.2) which holds under two 
special conditions. From (2.2) we can reobtain the marginal 
productivity rule
6f = 6f_ 
4 x 1 S x 2
(2.3)
either if





In the first case the weight of the (dis)utility of work is set 
equal to zero and preferences for work are therefore ignored. In 
the second case the marginal (dis)utility of the two tasks 
happens to be the same— a rather special result which implies 
that the workers are indifferent between them.
So, first an allocation of labour power which maximizes the 
productivity of labour may be socially undesirable, since task 
allocations implying a lower productivity (but a greater utility 
of labour) may be preferred. In other words, an allocation which 
satisfies condition (2.2) may well be preferred to an allocation 
which satisfies condition (2.3) although (2.3) is a necessary 




























































































Second, and related, the profit-maximizing capitalist- 
managed firm and the income-per-head-maximizing self-managed 
cooperative achieve sub-optimal results because they apply the 
"marginal productivity rule" instead of condition (2.2) as a 
management criterion. That is, it follows from condition (2.2) 
that profit-maximization and income per head maximization are 
both socially undesirable management criteria for the very same 
reason: they both ignore the preferences of workers on the
uses of their labour power.
Third, income per head maximization cannot be a good way of
approaching workers' self-management. It is unreasonable to
think that workers would ignore their own preferences on the
9allocation of their own labour power. A better approximation 
to "true" self-management can be obtained by assuming that 
members of a cooperative pay attention to both the income they 
earn and the (dis)utility they feel when deciding which tasks 
to perform; a self-managed cooperative maximizes the weighted 
sum of income and utility derived by one unit of labour power 
(and not simply the income derived by it). The objective 
function of a true, self-managed cooperative is, therefore, a 
function T such that:
apQ + bU(x.,x„)
T = ------- 5-------  (2.3)
where a and b are again respectively the weights of the 
productivity (in value) and utility of labour. Similarly to 
(2.1), maximizing (2.3) yields the following first-order 
conditions:


































































































If the price p of output is equal to the social evaluation of 
product u, then the self-managed firm achieves those conditions 
necessary for social welfare to be maximized. Compared with the 
textbook profit-maximizing capitalist firm the true self-managed 
cooperative is characterized by a higher welfare and by a lower 
productivity level. The profit-maximizing capitalist firm 
achieves conditions (1.5). These conditions are equivalent to 
the conditions necessary for maximizing labour productivity 
which are, in general, inconsistent with conditions (2.2) neces­
sary for maximizing social welfare. The true self-managed coop­
erative achieves conditions (2.4). These conditions are equiva­
lent to conditions (2.2) which are necessary for maximizing 
social welfare but are, in general, inconsistent with the condi­
tions necessary for maximizing productivity. This result 
implies that in comparison with the textbook profit-maximizing 
firm the self-managed firm can improve working conditions and 
welfare in general by internalizing workers' preferences. Also 
it can be expected to have a lower productivity since its goal 
shifts from a goal equivalent to maximizing productivity (i.e. 
profit-maximization) to a more general goal which includes that 
of making jobs as attractive as possible. On this ground the 
conclusion of the preceding, section can be challenged. When
compared with the textbook profit-maximizing firm, the "true"
1 0self-managed firm can claim to improve working conditions.
3. The conclusions of the above section have a limited va­
lidity however, because the textbook profit-maximizing firm has 
to be (at least partially) reconsidered when workers' preferenc­
es are taken into account. Whereas in the self-managed firm 




























































































power) and the (dis)utility of labour are both taken into account 
by the same people, in the capitalist firm these two goals are 
likely to "belong" to two different classes of people: the
employers and the employees. It is common experience that after 
the wage contract has been signed employers and employees 
complain (and often fight) for two different sets of reasons.
The employers usually complain about low work productivity, about 
tasks that are improperly performed (which can be conceptualized 
in terms of our model by saying that the workers perform 
different tasks from those desired by employers) or about low 
work mobility within the firm (i.e. workers refuse to move to 
tasks desired by employers). In contrast employees usually 
complain about the difficulty of the boring, uninteresting and 
disagreeable tasks they have been assigned; the joint 
maximization of productivity and utility considered in (2.3) is 
split, in the capitalist firm, into two different maximization 
problems performed by two different classes of agents.
The employers try to maximize labour productivity; i.e. they 
maximize
r  ( 2 - 5 >
since, given the agreed wage, the higher the product extracted 
from one unit of labour power, the higher their profits.
The employees try to maximize the utility derived by 
performing one unit of labour power (or to minimize labour 
disutility); i.e. they maximize
U(x1,x2)




























































































because, given the agreed wage, the higher the utility derived 
from one unit of labour, the higher is their welfare.
jfe i A AIf we denote by a and b (where a = 1 - b' ) the weights 
that (2.5) and (2.6) have in the objective function of the 
firm, then the firm has an objective function:
F PQN + b
*  U( X1 , X 2 )
N (2.7)
This function, F, is very similar to the function T maximized 
by the cooperative. Maximizing (2.7) yields necessary condi­
tions almost identical to (2.4) (i.e. the conditions achieved
by a self-managed cooperative). Indeed, the only difference
jfe Abetween F and T is the nature of the parameters a , b and a, 
b. The two weights a and b of the function T express the 
preferences of the members of the cooperative and, in particu­
lar, the weights that members of the self-managed firm give to
the income and the utility obtained by employing one unit of
A Alabour power. In contrast, the two weights a and b of the 
function F express the weights that employers and employees 
manage to establish in practice.
The textbook profit-maximizing firm can be reinterpreted
as a particular case of a firm maximizing F. This case holds
Awhen the weight of the employees (i.e. b ) in establishing the 
goals of the firm is equal to zero and the weight of the 
employers (i.e. a ) is equal to the maximum weight (i.e. is 
equal to 1). In this particular case the firm maximizes the 
labour productivity and achieves an allocation shown to be 




























































































is, therefore, a very particular case where workers behave as 
machines and offer no resistance to a management rule which 
ignores their needs.
In general, within a capitalist firm, workers and employ­
ers maximize the two different functions (2.5) and (2.6), and 
the two weights a and b express their power relations in the 
formation of the goals of the firm. We could say that, within 
the capitalist firm, there is an "internalization" struggle. 
Each side tries to make the other give as large a weight as 
possible to its objective function. Each side tries to make 
the other internalize its objective function.
This internalization struggle can take two forms. It can 
take the form of open conflict. In this case, which can be 
called the case of the "conflictual firm", monitoring, 
disciplinary measures and so on are used by the employers to 
try to internalize their goal with the workers. The workers 
react by strikes and other forms of struggle. The internali­
zation struggle can also be solved more peacefully by finding 
instruments that reduce goal incongruence and produce "fair" 
compromises. In this case, which can be called the case of 
the "participatory firm", profit-sharing and involvement of 
the workers in the decisions of the firm and job tenure are 
used by the employers and the employees as means for internal­
izing each other's goals and reducing goal incongruence.
Unlike the textbook profit-maximizing firm, in both the 
conflictual and the participatory firm the productivity weight 



























































































and the utility weight can be positive. Consequently, conflictual 
and participatory firms do not necessarily maximize productivity 
and it is possible (but not necessary) that the self-managed firm 
achieves higher productivity than these more realistic types of 
capitalist firms. Two other reasons make this likely. The 
absence of goal incongruence and of struggle between employers and 
employees can have positive productivity effects in the self- 
managed firm. Moreover, only in the self-managed firm can workers 
.fully enjoy the fruits of their productivity (and fully suffer the 
consequences of low labour productivity). This itself is likely 
to increase productivity.
In spite of the possibility that self-management may increase 
labour productivity, the true advantage of self-management is that 
workers themselves choose the weights they give to labour 
productivity and utility. Under self-management these weights are 
only the expression of social preferences and not the outcome of 
fierce conflicts or acceptable compromises. For this reason the 
"weights" chosen by a self-managed firm are preferable to those 
chosen by a capitalist firm, even when labour productivity is 
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more completely illustrated in PAGANO (1983a)
and PAGANO (1983b).
9. This observation is also made in VANEK (1969) and HORVAT 
(1982). This point implies that the workers may have 
different and even conflicting interests in the distribution 
of work within the cooperative. In this paper I am not 
concerned with this problem. I assume that workers are 
uniformly allocated and have identical preferences among 
different tasks.
10. REICH and DEVINE (1981) believe that self-management can 
improve working conditions because it reduces monitoring 
costs which, in turn, are shown to imply a very detailed and 
unsatisfactory division of labour within the capitalist 
firm. I agree, but the point made here is different: 
working conditions can improve under self-management 
independently of monitoring costs simply because the 




























































































capitalist firm. I have also shown in PAGANO (1983a) and 
(1983b) that a very detailed division of labour is 
introduced in a capitalist firm quite independently of 
decreasing monitoring costs.
DREZE (1976) and DREZE and HAGEN (1978) have suggested 
that the choice of working conditions can be treated in a 
way equivalent to the choice of the quality of consumption 
goods. In both cases they come to the interesting 
conclusion that the market is efficient only if the number 
of goods is greater than the number of characteristics. 
However DREZE's analysis misses one important difference 
between the product and the labour market. The former is 
usually organized by sales contracts, the latter is often 
organized by employment contracts. In the case of 
employment contracts the most important issue is not the 
possibility or impossibility of computing a complete set 
of characteristics from a complete set of traded commodi­
ties. By contrast a more important and preliminary issue 
is that the employment contract implies that the set of 
traded commodities is incomplete. In other words the 
existence of firms implies that some task or intermediate 
product markets (that would be traded under a regime of 
complete sales contracts as I have illustrated in the pin­
making example) do not exist. Here it is the existence of 
firms that implies that workers' self-management can 
improve working conditions whereas in DREZE's paper it is 
the impossibility of computing characteristics' prices 
that allows the same conclusion. While the two points are 




























































































11. In an interesting paper SVEJNAR (1982) examines the case of 
a firm where the objective functions of employers and 
employees are jointly maximized. SVEJNAR's paper considers 
the bargaining process concerning the distribution of 
income. Here the wage is assumed to be fixed by competi­
tion before production takes place and the analysis focuses 
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